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Abstract   This article will argue that 6RXWK $IULFD¶V DSSURDFK WR FRQIOLFW PHGLDWLRQ DQG
SHDFHEXLOGLQJLVLQIRUPHGE\WKH$1&¶VH[SHULHQFHRIWKHWUDQVLWLRQWRGHPRFUDF\LQ6RXWK
Africa and is widely misinterpreted. This was particularly evident in the Libyan crisis, where 
South Africa was widely accused of exhibiting a morally duplicitous and ideologically 
rudderless foreign policy because of the manner in which it initially supported intervention 
and subsequently became one of the fiercest critics of the NATO campaign. It will be argued 
WKDWWKLVLVDQLQDFFXUDWHFDULFDWXUHRI6RXWK$IULFD¶VIRUHLJQSROLF\DQGWKDW6RXWK$IULFD¶V
approach could in fact inject vital pluralism into debates about the future of humanitarian 
interventions in Africa. The article draws upon interviews with senior officials in the ruling 
African National Congress (ANC) and South African officials who negotiated the UN 
Security Council resolutions that sanctioned intervention in Libya.  
Keywords: Libya, South Africa, ANC, NATO, Responsibility to Protect 
 
Introduction 
7KLV DUWLFOH ZLOO H[SORUH 6RXWK $IULFD¶V UHVSRQVH WR WKH 1$72 LQWHUYHQWLRQV LQ /LE\D WR
highlight the tensions and contradictions within its foreign policy formulation. Initially, as a 
non-permanent member of the UN Security Council at the time, South Africa had voted in 
IDYRXU RI 5HVROXWLRQ  DXWKRULVLQJ µDOO QHFHVVDU\ PHDVXUHV WR SURWHFW FLYLOLDQV DQG
FLYLOLDQSRSXODWHGDUHDVXQGHUWKUHDWRIDWWDFN¶LQ/LE\D (UNSC, 2011). However, as Simon 
$GDPV QRWHG µZLWKLQ GD\V 6RXWK $IULFD GLVSOD\HG VLJQLILFDQW VLJQV RI EX\HU
V UHPRUVH
distancing itself from the resulting NATO-led airstrikes¶ (Adams, 2013). Echoing sentiments 
raised by China, India, Brazil and Russia, South Africa quickly became critical of what it 
perceived to be the abuse of the mandate provided by Resolution 1973 by the NATO powers 
WRSXUVXHUHJLPHFKDQJHZKLFK3UHVLGHQW-DFRE=XPDDUJXHGµIOLHVLQWKHIDFHRIDOOHIIRUWV
to promote the sanctity of international law¶ (Mail & Guardian 2013). 
7KH DSSDUHQW LQFRQVLVWHQF\ H[KLELWHG LQ 6RXWK $IULFD¶V LQLWLDO VXSSRUW IRU 5HVROXWLRQ 
DQG LWV VXEVHTXHQW FULWLFLVPRI1$72¶V LQWHUYHQWLRQ LQ/LE\DZDV FKDUDFWHULVHGZLWKLQ WKH
ZRUOG SUHVV DV D µIOLS IORS¶ IRUHLJQ SROLF\ GHYRLd of a clear and coherent strategic, 
ideological or ethical direction. Africa Confidential (2011), for example, argued that Jacob 
=XPD¶V IRUHLJQSROLF\ ZDV FKDUDFWHULVHGE\D VHULHVRI µIOLS IORSV¶ FDXVHGE\ WKH ODFNRI D
clear definition. In a similar vein, The Economist (2011) GHFODUHG 6RXWK $IULFD¶V IRUHLJQ
SROLF\WREHµDOORYHUWKHSODFH¶TXRWLQJIRUPHU6RXWK$IULFDQDPEDVVDGRU7RP:KHHOHUDV
VD\LQJ µ1RQHRI LWPDNHV DQ\ UHDO VHQVH7KHUH
V QR VXEVWDQFH no coherence¶. Academics 
also highlighted what WKH\ UHJDUGHG DV 6RXWK $IULFD¶V µIOLS-IORS IRUHLJQ SROLF\ VWDQFH¶ 
(Aboagye, 2012, p. 41). 
7KH YDFLOODWLRQV LQ 6RXWK $IULFD¶V SXEOLF SURQRXQFHPHQWV PDGH =XPD DQG WKH $IULFDQ
8QLRQ $8 DV D ZKROH DQ HDV\ WDUJHW IRU WKH 1$72 SRZHUV¶ SURSDJDQGD PDFKLQHV (De 
Waal, 2012)&ULWLFVDUJXHGWKDW6RXWK$IULFD¶VUHIXVDOWRVKDUHWKH:HVWHUQSRVLWLRQRQWKH
QHHGIRUUHJLPHFKDQJHLQ/LE\DDQG=XPD¶VLQVLVWHQFHRQILQGLQJDQHJRWLDWHGVROXWLRQYLD
WKH$8VHYHUHO\XQGHUPLQHG6RXWK$IULFD¶VFODLPWREHDKXPDQULJKWV champion. This was 
evident in the Manichean language employed by the likes of Liam Fox, then UK Defence 
6HFUHWDU\ ZKR EHPRDQHG 6RXWK $IULFD¶V µGLVDSSRLQWLQJ¶ RSSRVLWLRQ WR UHJLPH FKDQJH DQG
their reluctance to support the NATO-backed National Transitional Council (NTC), arguing 
that: 
It is very clear what side the Libyan people are on and I think that is what the South 
African government should respond to. I think there will be huge moral pressure on 
South Africa. They wanted the world at one point to stand with them against 
apartheid. I think they now need to stand with the Libyan people. (Guardian 2011) 
As one columnist for The Atlantic DUJXHG6RXWK$IULFD¶VVWDQFHRQWKH1$72LQWHUYHQWLRQLQ
/LE\D UHIOHFWHG D µEHWUD\DO RI WKH PDVVLYH LQWHUQDWLRQDO JRRGZLOO LW HDUQHG¶ DIWHU DSDUWKHLG
DQGWKDW6RXWK$IULFDKDGQRZEHFRPHDµURJXHGHPRFUDF\¶LQZRUOGDIIDLUV6XFKQDUUDWLYHV
reinforced the idea that South Africa had demonstrated an inconsistent approach to the 
Libyan crisis and a morally duplicitous stance on human rights promotion: a duplicity that 
has been highlighted by scholars in other contexts, such as where South Africa is perceived to 
µJRVRIW¶RQKXPDQULJKWVDEXVHUVOLNH5REHUW0XJDEHDQG2PDU%DKLUDPRQJRWKHUV (Taylor 
and Williams 2002; Nathan 2011). 
This article will argue that the narratives of leaders like Fox not only gloss over the moral 
LQFRQVLVWHQFLHVRI WKH:HVWHUQSRZHUV WKH\DOVRIDLO WRFRPSUHKHQG6RXWK$IULFD¶VIRUHLJQ
SROLF\5DWKHUWKDQLGHRORJLFDOLQFRQVLVWHQF\6RXWK$IULFD¶VDSSDUHQWµIOLSIORS¶RYHU/LE\D
DFWXDOO\ UHIOHFWV6RXWK$IULFD¶V FRQVLVWHQW WKRXJKGHHSO\SUREOHPDWLF DSSURDFK WR FRQIOLFW
resolution and peace building. The idiosyncratic nature of this long-term approach can only 
be understood within the context of SoutK$IULFD¶V WUDQVLWLRQ IURPDSDUWKHLG WRGHPRFUDF\
and the confluence of ideas, identities and ideologies that emerged from it (Landsberg, 2005). 
7KLV HVVD\ ZLOO DQDO\VH WKH FRUH HOHPHQWV RI ZKDW FDQ EH LGHQWLILHG DV 3UHWRULD¶V DSSURDFK
towards conflict resolution and peace building, namely: quiet diplomacy, transitional power 
sharing and transitional justice. It is an approach that cannot (and should not) be ignored: for 
DOO LWV LGHRORJLFDO VKRUWFRPLQJV DQG 3UHWRULD¶V FDWDVWURSKLF SXEOLF GLSORPDF\ 6RXWK $Irica 
remains an important regional power, one that has been at the centre of political, economic 
and security reforms in Africa, as well as conflict mediation across the continent and in 
seemingly intractable conflicts in Northern Ireland and Israel-PalestLQH 6RXWK $IULFD¶V
approach to resolving African security challenges adds much-needed pluralism to debates 
about humanitarian interventions in Africa and could present an alternative to the kind of 
NATO intervention seen in Libya characterised by an arrogance and bluster that has 
potentially damaged international consensus regarding humanitarian intervention and the 
µ5HVSRQVLELOLW\WR3URWHFW¶5WR3SULQFLSOH (Hehir and Murray, 2014). 
South Africa: an idiosyncratic emerging power? 
In 1993, Mandela (1993, p. 88) KDG IDPRXVO\GHFODUHG WKDW µKXPDQ ULJKWVwill be the light 
WKDWJXLGHVRXUIRUHLJQSROLF\¶ and a recent White Paper loudly declared the promotion of the 
humanitarian value of ubuntu DV WKH FRUQHUVWRQH RI 6RXWK $IULFD¶V IRUHLJQ SROLF\ (SA 
Government, 2011). However, South Africa has courted considerable criticism in 
international circles for what is perceived to be its soft-touch approach towards dealing with 
known tyrants such as Robert Mugabe and, more recently, Gaddafi. One explanation for this 
is that South Africa is willing to subordinate the promotion of human rights to the pursuit of 
LWVFRUHQDWLRQDO LQWHUHVWV$V(YDQVVWDWHVGHVSLWH6RXWK$IULFD¶VRVWHQVLYHFRPPLWPHQWWR
putting human rights promotion at the centre of its foreign policy, µLQSUDFWLFHDFDOFXOXVRI
financial, commercial, political and defence interests supplanted the carefully crafted ethical 
GLPHQVLRQ LQ IRUHLJQ SROLF\¶ ZKLFK ZDV XOWimately informed by a blend of neorealist and 
neoliberal principles (Evans, 1996; Williams, 2000; Vale and Ruiters 2004). This has been 
highlighted in relation to its conduct in the DRC (Taylor and Williams 2001), as well as its 
SROLF\RIµTXLHWGLSORPDF\¶ZLWK5REHUW0XJDEHLQ=LPEDEZHZKHUHLWLVDOOHJHGWKDW6RXWK
Africa has prioritisHG VWURQJ UHODWLRQV ZLWK 0XJDEH DQG DFFHVV WR =LPEDEZH¶V HFRQRPLF
resources over a principled and consistent promotion of human rights (McKinley 2004). 
6HHQ LQ WKLV OLJKW 6RXWK $IULFD ZRXOG EH QR GLIIHUHQW IURP DQ\ µQRUPDO¶ SRZHU UDWLRQDOO\
calculating its actions in terms of costs and benefits. It was also alleged that, like other 
African nations, South Africa felt beholden to Gaddafi because of the financial support he 
had allegedly given to the party in the past. For example, James Kirchick writing for The 
Atlantic DUJXHG WKDW WKH $1&¶V µOLQJHULQJ DIIHFWLRQ¶ IRU *DGGDIL ZDV GXH WR WKH IDFW WKDW
µ6RXWK $IULFD LV QRW PXFK GLIIHUHQW IURP PDQ\ RWKHU VXE-Saharan African states, whom 
4DGGDIL VKRZHUHGZLWK PRQH\ IRUGHFDGHV¶EXW WKDW6RXWK$IULFD¶V µP\RSLF¶GHference to 
*DGGDILZDVµXQLTXHO\GLVDSSRLQWLQJJLYHQLWVSUHWHQVLRQVWREHLQJWKHOHDGLQJH[SRVLWRURI
democracy on the continent (Kirchick 2011)¶ 2Q D SHUVRQDO OHYHO =XPD¶V LQFRQVLVWHQW
approach and his reluctance to recognise the National Transitional Council (NTC) was 
alleged by some sections of the press to be due to his close relationship to Gaddafi, whom he 
IUHTXHQWO\ UHIHUUHG WR DV µRXU EURWKHU OHDGHU¶ $V 'H :DDO (2012) notes, such narratives 
presented the NATO powers with an easy means to marginalise African voices during the 
publicity campaigns surrounding the intervention.  
An alternative approach suggests that a reason why the championing of human rights is often 
QHJOHFWHG E\ 6RXWK $IULFDQ SROLF\ PDNHUV LV PRUH WR GR ZLWK WKH $1&¶V LGHQWLW\ DV D
liberation moment, rather than simply the pursuit of some objectively defined national 
LQWHUHVW7KH$1&LGHQWLILHVLWVHOIDVDKHURLFOLEHUDWLRQPRYHPHQWUDWKHUWKDQDQµRUGLQDU\¶
political party and the ANC draws upon the symbolic political capital accrued from its role in 
the liberation struggle to appeal to its core support base domestically, as well as uniting the 
SDUW\DURXQGLWVUDLVRQG¶rWUHµWRHQVXUHWKHXOWLPDWHYLFWRU\RIWKHSHRSOH¶VVWUXJJOHDJDLQVW
DSDUWKHLGDQGFRORQLDOLVP¶ (ANC, 2012)7KH$1&¶VH[SHULHQFHRIGHFDGHVLQH[LOHOREE\LQJ
unresponsive (or openly hostile) Western governments to support the campaign to end 
DSDUWKHLG KDV OHIW D ODVWLQJ LPSULQW RQ WKH $1&¶V IRUHLJQ SROLF\ WKLQNLQJ /DXULH 1DWKDQ 
(2011, p. 63) IRU H[DPSOH DUJXHV WKDW WKHUH LV DQ µDQWL-LPSHULDOLVW FRUH¶ LQ 6RXWK $IULFDQ
foreign policy making, which trumps other priorities like human rights and democracy 
promotion, even where these might more clearly serve the national interest. He uses the 
example of Darfur, where South Africa used its position on the Security Council to 
continuously oppose reVROXWLRQV FRQGHPQLQJ 2PDU %DVKLU¶V JRYHUQPHQW LQ 6XGDQ RU
enabling action against him because of an instinctive aversion to Western interventions in 
what South Africa considered to be an African problem requiring African solutions. As 
Nathan (2011, p. 74) DUJXHV KRZHYHU µthe only winners were the dictators and the clear 
losers were their victims. The poor, who were the intended beneficiaries of the anti-
LPSHULDOLVWSURMHFWHQGHGXSVDFULILFHGRQLWVDOWHU¶It is a criticism shared by Neethling, who 
arguHV WKDW PRUH JHQHUDOO\ µLW LV KDUG WR IDXOW 6RXWK $IULFD¶V VWDQG RQ LQHTXLWDEOH JOREDO
power relations, but it is equally hard to see any productive results arising from a strategy that 
blocks international action against dictatorial regimes¶ (Neethling, 2012, p.25).  
 In the case of Libya, it was suggested that the ANC felt a long-standing ideological affinity 
Gaddafi due to his steadfast support for the anti-apartheid struggle. Indeed, in 1998 in the 
presence of then US President Bill Clinton, Mandela produced a stern rebuke to those 
SUHVVXULQJKLPWRWDNHDKDUGHUOLQHRQ*DGGDILDUJXLQJWKDWµRXUPRUDODXWKRULW\GLFWDWHVWKDW
we should not abandon those who helped us in the darkest hour in the history of [South 
$IULFD@ « WKRVH ZKR KDYH EHUDWHG PH IRU EHLQJ OR\DO WR our friends can go and throw 
WKHPVHOYHV LQWR D SRRO¶ 5HIHUULQJ WR WKLV TXRWH DQG DOVR =XPD¶V SHUVLVWHQFH LQ FDOOLQJ
*DGGDIL µRXU EURWKHU OHDGHU¶ WKH PHGLD RIWHQ SUHVHQWHG WKLV DV µHYLGHQFH¶ RI DQ HUUDWLF
HPRWLYHLPSXOVHJXLGLQJ6RXWK$IULFD¶VIRUHLJQSolicy; one that compromised its position as 
a champion of human rights. It is a view shared by opposition parties in South Africa, 
LQFOXGLQJ WKH 'HPRFUDWLF $OOLDQFH ZKRVH IRUHLJQ DIIDLUV VSRNHVSHUVRQ DUJXHG WKDW µ7KH
South African government has obviously been on the side of Gaddafi from an ideological and 
historical perspective. It was inevitably going to create a foreign policy nightmare for South 
$IULFD« (Guardian, 2011)¶ 
$ FXUVRU\ LQVSHFWLRQ RI WKH $1&¶V SROLF\ GRFXPHQWV PLJKW UHDIILUP WKLV YLHZSRLnt that 
6RXWK$IULFD¶VIRUHLJQSROLF\LVLQVRPHZD\GHWHUPLQHGE\DQLQVWLQFWLYHDQGHPRWLYHDQWL-
imperialist identity. A recent discussion document, for example, set out the need for 
strengthening south-south cooperation and African institutions because in the wake of events 
like the intervention in Libya:  
We expect neo-colonial tendencies seeking to re-subordinate Africa to the whims and 
interests of powerful external factors will continue as old powers seek new ways of 
maintaining their hegemony over global affairs in the face of shifts in global power 
away from them. Unless something drastic is done to strengthen the institutions and 
leadership in Africa, its voice and choices will continue to diminish. (ANC 2012, p. 
16) 
The NATO intervention was also GHFODUHGE\WKH$1&¶V<RXWK/HDJXH± which was at the 
peak of its power in 2011 - DVDQµLPSHULDOLVWLQWHUIHUHQFH¶E\:HVWHUQSRZHUVZLWKDµKLVWRU\
RIEORRGOHWWLQJDQGFULPLQDOLW\¶ZKLFKDPRXQWHGWRµDGHFODUDWLRQRIZDUQRWRQO\RQ/LE\D
but on the African continent (ANCYL, 2011)¶ 7KH <RXWK /HDJXH ZDV DEOH WR H[HUW
considerable pressure on senior ANC officials during its 2012 Centenary Policy Conference 
where figures like Foreign Minister Nkosana Mashabane told ANC conference delegates 
behind closed doRUVWKDWZKLOHWKH\ZHUHFULWLFDORI*DGDIIL¶VKXPDQULJKWVUHFRUGWKH\ZHUH
also unsupportive of regime change because they could not be sure of who was driving it and 
WKDW*DGGDILµFDOOVLPSHULDOLVWVLPSHULDOLVWV¶ZKLFKWKH\VXSSRUWHG (Personal communications 
and observations, 2012).  
:KDWWKHVHGLIIHULQJDFFRXQWVKROGLQFRPPRQLVWKHQRWLRQWKDW6RXWK$IULFD¶VUHVSRQVHWR
the Libyan crisis reflected a long-standing moral duplicity where human rights promotion 
would play second fiddle to other drivers foreign policy formulation. However, neither of 
WKHVHDSSURDFKHVRIIHUDQDFFXUDWHSRUWUD\DORI3UHWRULD¶VEHKDYLRXUGXULQJWKH/LE\DQFULVLV
)LUVWO\LWLVXQFOHDUZKHWKHU*DGGDIL¶VSRVLWLRQZDVLQGHHGLQ6RXWK$IULFD¶VLQWHUHVWDQGWKH
ANC has historically been extremely conflicted over Gaddafi. While Mandela embraced him 
and wanted to bring him in from the cold, his successor Thabo Mbeki was openly hostile 
WRZDUGV *DGGDIL DQG LQ SDUWLFXODU *DGGDIL¶V DWWHPSWV WR PHGGOH LQ WKH LQWHUQDO DIIDLUV RI
other African nations to promote his own vision for Africa, which was in direct competition 
ZLWK0EHNL¶VYLVLRQRIDQµ$IULFDQUHQDLVVDQFH¶URRWHGLQ WKHSURPRWLRQRIQHROLEHUDOJRRG
governance and a federalist African Union (Landsberg 2012; Becker 2010). As MbeNL¶V
'HSXW\)RUHLJQ0LQLVWHU$]L]3DKDGSXWLWµ*DGGDILVHWXVEDFNRQWKH$IULFDQFRQWLQHQW«
,¶YHEHHQWRPDQ\$828PHHWLQJVZKHUHKHMXVWKHOGXVEack for 10 years or even longer¶ 
(Personal communication, Aziz Pahad, 2012). Alex De Waal (2012, pp. 355-357) has also 
dispelled the myth that African heads of state were united behind Gaddafi because of his 
largesse, pointing to the divisive nature of his interventionalist policies in Africa as a core 
reason behind deep African divisions over the NATO campaign. 
Furthermore, one must also look beyond the loud discourses of anti-imperialism aired in 
public in order to establish the instrumental purposes that they can fulfil. First, it is important 
WRQRWHWKDW6RXWK$IULFD¶VIRUHLJQSROLF\LVGULYHQE\DEURDG array of agents and not by the 
ANC alone. Department of International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO) officials 
responsible for negotiating resolutions at the UN would often greet questions about the 
discourses of anti-imperialism with rye amusement, affirming that the day-to-day conduct of 
IRUHLJQ DIIDLUV ZDV LQVXODWHG IURP VXFK µSROLWLFNLQJ¶ (Personal commincaitions). The anti 
imperialist discourses clearly serve important functions for internal ANC politics in terms of 
legitimating foreign policy decisions that were at odds with the more militant base of the 
$1&PHPEHUVKLS$V$]L]3DKDGUHPDUNHGVXFKµSRSXOLVW¶UKHWRULFUHIOHFWHGDVWUDWHJ\RI
WKHDWULFDOµVHOIIODJHOODWLRQ¶RQWKHSDUWRIVHQLRU$1&PLQLVWHUVWKDWLI\RXUHSHDWWKHZRUGV
µDQWL-imperLDOLVP¶ HQRXJK WLPHV \RX ZLOO EH VSLULWXDOO\ H[RQHUDWHG IRU \RXU SROLF\ VLQV 
(Personal communications). These discourses serve as part of the social glue that holds 
together the identity of the ANC as a whole and should be understood as part of a broader 
catalogue of radical rhetorics that have helped the ANC to reconcile its identity as a 
revolutionary movement with the realpolitik of conforming to prerogatives of neoliberal 
globalisation. They also serve an important external function in terms of providing the ANC 
with a dexterous external identity: in order to pursue its aspirations of becoming a global 
power, the anti-imperialist discourses help to establish the ANC as a symbolic champion of 
Africa and the Global South, even where the contradictions of pursuing its long-term 
aspirations of global influence lead it to override regional interests. 
8OWLPDWHO\WKHUHLVOHVVRIDGLYLGHEHWZHHQ6RXWK$IULFD¶VSRVLWLRQRQOLEHUDOLQWHUYHQWLRQV
and that led by the NATO powers than the anti-imperialist discourses suggest. It has, after all, 
EHHQ $IULFDQ VWDWHV WKDW KDYH OHG WKH ZD\ LQ WHUPV RI PRYLQJ IURP D QRUP RI µQRQ-
LQWHUYHQWLRQ¶WRZDUGVµQRQ-LQGLIIHUHQFH¶ (Williams 2007)7KH$8¶V&RQVWLWXWLYH$FWDUWLFOH
4 h. pre-empted the global RtoP imitative of  LQHVWDEOLVKLQJ LQSULQFLSOH µ7KHULJKWRI
the Union to intervene in a Member State pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in respect of 
JUDYHFLUFXPVWDQFHVQDPHO\ZDUFULPHVJHQRFLGHDQGFULPHVDJDLQVWKXPDQLW\¶ (AU 2000). 
Indeed, the African footprint is clear on the establishment of what would later become known 
as the RtoP principle, with scholars like Gareth Evans (2006, p. 714) describing it as resulting 
IURP µSHUVLVWHQW DGYRFDF\ E\ VXE-6DKDUDQ$IULFDQFRXQWULHV OHGE\6RXWK$IULFD¶ (see also 
Kuwali and Viljoen, 2014). South Africa has therefore been at the centre of supporting these 
reforms while also actively promoting a continent-wide project of liberal intervention, 
promoting its primary security goal of regional stability while also championing the spread of 
QHROLEHUDOµJRRGJRYHUQDQFH¶WKDWVXSSRUWV6RXWK$IULFD¶VGRPHVWLFLPSHUDWLYHRIDFKLHYLQJ
sustained economic growth (Landsberg, 2010). As Bentley and Southall (2005, pp. 2-3) note, 
µWKLV FRQFHUQ LV QRW VLPSO\ KXPDQLWDULDQ¶ EXW LV LQVWHDG D µUHFRJQLWLRQ WKDW GHPRFUDF\ DQG
development in South Africa are both inextricably linked to progress towards these goals 
WKURXJKRXW $IULFD DV D ZKROH¶ Promoting peace, stability, democratisation and economic 
growth were thus framed as the cornerstone RI3UHWRULD¶VIRUHLJQSROLF\DQGUHIOHFWDEURDGHU
goal of establishing a new continental order in Africa (Landsberg 2012). If they are able to 
see beyond the fiery rhetoric, Western policy makers are likely to find in South Africa a 
potentially pliant partner whose core foreign policy interests in Africa are not all that 
dissimilar from the Western powers: stability and economic opportunity. To do so requires a 
GHWDLOHGXQGHUVWDQGLQJRI6RXWK$IULFD¶VWUDQVLWLRQWRGHPRFUDF\DQGKRZWKHFRQVWHOODWLRQ
ideas, identities and ideologies that emerged from it to forge what can be identified as South 
$IULFD¶VDSSURDFKWRWDFNOLQJ$IULFD¶VVHFXULW\GLOHPPDV 
The South African approach to conflict resolution and peace building 
6RXWK$IULFD¶VH[SHULHQFHRIWKHWUDQVition from apartheid has heavily influenced its approach 
to conflict resolution and peace building elsewhere. As Habib (2009, p.143) QRWHVµ,WVDFWRUV
the ideas they express, the interests they represent and the institutions they craft are all 
crucially LQIOXHQFHGDQGLPSDFWHGXSRQE\WKHGHPRFUDWLFWUDQVLWLRQDQGKRZLWKDVHYROYHG¶
,QVKRUWWKHLUH[SHULHQFHRIWKHµPLUDFOHWUDQVLWLRQ¶LPEXHVSROLF\PDNHUVZLWKDEHOLHIWKDW
South Africa is uniquely placed to export this model of peaceful transition to the rest of the 
African continent and beyond (Landsberg 2005; 2010b). As Aziz Pahad remarked, the most 
LPSRUWDQWFRQWULEXWLRQ6RXWK$IULFDFRXOGPDNHDVDFRQWLQHQWDO OHDGHUZDV WRHPSOR\ µWKH
moral authority it has derived from its own process of national reconciliation and 
GHPRFUDWLVDWLRQ¶ (quoted in Sidiropoulos 2007). 
Although no catch-all blueprint exists, the South African approach can be summarised as 
having three core elements. These core elements are geared towards producing inclusive 
peace settlements which, Pretoria hopes, will prepare the ground for long-term democratic 
consolidation, regional stability and prosperity. First, there is the promotion of quiet 
diplomacy5DWKHU WKDQ HQJDJLQJ LQZKDW LW SHUFHLYHV WREH WKH µPHJDSKRQHGLSORPDF\¶RI
Western states towards Africa, South Africa has generally avoided denouncing incumbent 
state elites when they perceive the participation of these elites in the peace process to be 
essential to sustainable democratic transitions: to publicly denounce them and severe ties 
would risk alienating these elites and jeopardise the whole process. Influenced by the 
µFRQVWUXFWLYHHQJDJHPHQW¶SROLFLHVRIWKH:HVWHUQJRYHUQPHQWVWRZDUGV6RXWK$IULFDLQWKH
1980s, Pretoria takes a stand that it is more productive to gently (and quietly) cajole each side 
of a conflict behind closed doors into making compromises and agreements. As former 
Foreign Minister Dlamini-Zuma (2007) puts it: 
It is our experience that in certain instances, we make choices when equally important 
principles stand against each other. Our own national experience has also taught us 
the value of seeking negotiated solutions to problems, no matter how intractable they 
may at first seem, and of engaging all relevant role players in a dialogue. 
This sentiment was echoed recently by Deputy Foreign Minister Ebrahim Ebrahim (2014), 
ZKRDUJXHG WKDW µ2XURZQSHDFHIXO WUDQVLWLRQ IURP WKHEULQNRIFLYLOZDU LV FHQWUDO WRRXU
approach to the resolution of disputes and remains an example to the world of how a deeply 
divided country on the brink of disaster can build a nation through all-LQFOXVLYHGLDORJXH¶ 
Thus, infused with the experience of the late 1980s and early 1990s, South African leaders 
have a strong belief in encouraging familiarity among protagonists, giving them space to 
VSHQG WLPH LQ HDFK RWKHUV¶ FRPSDQ\ DQG WKHUHE\ LQFUHDVLQJ WKH SHUFHSWLRQ WKDW GLIIHUHQFHV
can be reconciled even in the most intractable conflicts. Progress might be slow, as South 
African experience points to, but Pretoria prefers to take this careful incremental approach in 
order to keep these conflicts on a low flame while common ground can be discovered, rather 
than engaging in potentially damaging, heavy handed interventions that could provoke 
acrimonious fallouts with uncertain consequences (Adelmann, 2004, p. 271). Former 
3UHVLGHQW1HOVRQ0DQGHOD¶VDSSURDFKWRPHGLDWLQJEHWZHHQ*DGGDILDQGWKH:HVWHUQSRZHUV
after the Lockerbie bombing is an example of this approach (Boyd-Judson, 2005). Thabo 
0EHNL¶V DSSURDFK WR =LPEDEZH KDV UHFHLYHG WKH most attention in this respect, however, 
where Mbeki insisted on not isolating the Mugabe regime by engaging in quiet diplomacy as 
RSSRVHG WR ZKDW KH GHVFULEHG DV WKH FOXPV\ DQG XQKHOSIXO µPHJDSKRQH¶ WDFWLFV RI 7RQ\
%ODLU¶V8.JRYHUQPHQWLQSDUWLFXODUZKHn they lobbied for Zimbabwe to be thrown out of the 
Commonwealth and to impose economic sanctions (Taylor, 2005).  
,Q /LE\D ZKLOH =XPD¶V JRYHUQPHQW FRQGHPQHG SXEOLFO\ WKH KXPDQ ULJKWV DEXVHV EHLQJ
committed, unlike the Western responses, which were directly targeted at Gaddafi himself, 
South Africa was careful not to point the finger directly at the regime and instead referred to 
the abuses in an impersonal manner and stressed the QHHGWRWDFNOHDEXVHVIURPµDOOVLGHVRI
WKHFRQIOLFW¶=XPDZHQW WRJUHDW OHQJWKV WRTXLHWO\FDMROH*DGGDIL LQWRDFFHSWLQJ WKH$8¶V
µ5RDGPDS¶ SHDFH SURSRVDO LQYROYLQJ VRPH IRUP RI SRZHU VKDULQJ DUUDQJHPHQW =XPD¶V
regular visits and conversations with Gaddafi thus reflected a calculated strategy of 
maintaining links with a leader who was otherwise ostracised by other international capitals; 
OLQNVWKDWZRXOGSRWHQWLDOO\IDFLOLWDWHDVHFRQGHOHPHQWRI6RXWK$IULFD¶VDSSURDFKWRSHDFH
EXLOGLQJDQµLQFOXVLYH¶VHWWOHPHQWDQGSRZHU-sharing.  
South Africa advocates transitional power sharing in the form of an inclusive settlement that 
RIIHUVDOO WKH OHDGLQJSURWDJRQLVWVD IXWXUH UROH LQ WKHFRXQWU\0RGHOOHGRQ6RXWK$IULFD¶V
*RYHUQPHQWRI1DWLRQDO8QLW\LQWKHVWKLVPRGHODWWHPSWVWRUHGXFHIHDUVRIDµZLQQHU-
takes-DOO¶VHWWOHPHQt, creating the space necessary for concessions to be made by all sides and 
UHGXFLQJ WKH ULVN RI RQH VLGH SXOOLQJ RXW DQG SRWHQWLDOO\ DFWLQJ DV µVSRLOHUV¶ LQ WKH ZKROH
process. As Mandela himself admitted, for a long term transition of power to a new 
democratic order in South Africa, it was essential to have the old National Party regime 
within government so that the power of the army, state intelligence, and civil service etc. 
could be transferred effectively in the long term to generate a durable transferral of power 
between old and new elites. Once again, this is premised upon the belief that the on-going 
support of incumbent power holders is essential to building long term stability, and that their 
interests must in some way find accommodation in the post-conflict settlement. South 
$IULFD¶VDSSURDFKWKXVYDJXHO\UHVHPEOHVDIRUPRIZKDW$UHQG/LMSKDUW(1977) refers to as 
µFRQVRFLDWLRQDO¶SRZHUVKDULQJLQGLYLGHGVWDWHVZKHUHDOOVLJQLILFDQWVHJPHQWVRIDGLYLGHG
political community must at least be given a share in the government of their country through 
some form of shared or devolved power of the centre in order to give all groups a stake in the 
FRXQWU\¶VIXWXUH$V/HPDUFKDQG (2007, p. 11) quips, such power sharing models are a carrot 
µDLPHGDWFR-optinJWKHEDGJX\V¶ 
South Africa has promoted such settlements ± with varying degrees of success ± across the 
continent. For example, Mandela and Zuma were commended for their efforts in bringing a 
seemingly intractable conflict in Burundi to an end through painstaking efforts to forge an 
inclusive peace negotiations between a plethora of rebel movements and establishing a 
transitional power sharing government (Bentley and Southall 2005). South Africa played a 
major role in negotiating and facilitating ZimbabZH¶V*RYHUQPHQWRI1DWLRQDO8QLW\LQ
between the incumbent ZANUPF and the MDC, and has played an active role ± whether 
directly or through Thabo Mbeki in the African Union - at mediating in conflicts and 
promoting power sharing in Kenya, Burundi, SudaQ0DGDJDVFDU$QJROD&RW'¶,YRLUHWKH
Democratic Republic of Congo and the Comoros. The South African example of a peaceful 
transition to democracy through power sharing has thus been heralded, somewhat 
problematically (Hamill 2003), as an example to follow, such that power sharing agreements 
have become prominent across Africa in the last two decades as a means to move beyond 
conflict (Mehler 2009).  
In Libya, South Africa insisted on the need for an inclusive, negotiated settlement, in which 
Zuma said µDOO /LE\DQV EH JLYHQ D chance to talk among themselves¶ (New York Times 
2011). ,QVKRUWWKH$8¶V5RDGPDSHQYLVLRQHGDQLQFOXVLYHSROLWLFDOVHWWOHPHQWLQYROYLQJDOO
parties that would be enabled, initially, by the cessation of hostilities and the beginnings of 
GLDORJXHWKDWFRXOGDOORZWKHJRYHUQPHQWLQQHJRWLDWLRQZLWKRSSRVLWLRQIRUFHVWRµHPEDUN
XSRQWKHSDWKRIUHIRUPV¶WRZDUGVµGHPRFUDF\SROLWLFDOUHIRUPMXVWLFHSHDFHDQGVHFXULW\
DVZHOODVVRFLRHFRQRPLFGHYHORSPHQW«¶ (AU 2011). Eventually this would entail what the 
$8FDOOHGµDQDOO-LQFOXVLYHQDWLRQDOXQLW\JRYHUQPHQW¶LQFOXGLQJERWKWKH17&DQGUHPQDQWV
of the Gaddafi regime; something that the AU and South Africa continued to argue for even 
after a decisive military victory for the NTC, with senior ANC officials (personal 
communications, 2012) and Zuma (2011) himself arguing that it was needed to ensure a 
durable transition and regional stability. 
This policy of quiet diplomacy behind the scenes and the attempt to bring together an 
inclusive settlement was juxtaposed by senior South African officials to what they perceived 
WREH WKHµJXQ-KR¶DSSURDFK WDNHQE\ WKH3ZKLFKZDVGULYHQE\ WKHSROLWLFDODPELWLRQRI
toppling Gaddafi. As one senior official involved in negotiations at the UN remarked, while 
6RXWK$IULFDZDVEHLQJFULWLFL]HGµZKHQZHVD\WKDWGLDORJXHKDVWRLQFOXGHWKH³YLOODLQV´¶
1$72 ZDV JXLOW\ RI PDNLQJ D µIUHH IRU DOO¶ RXW RI GXH SURFHVV DQG DOVR RI EORFNLQJ ZKDW
South Africa saw as the most progressive and best prospect for promoting an enduring peace 
settlement (personal communications, 2012). The South African government feared that 
without an all-inclusive dialogue involving the remnants of the Gaddafi regime there was a 
strong possibility that Libya would experience an unstable transition to democracy, especially 
given the fragmented nature of the forces that aligned to topple Gaddafi. It was widely argued 
by South African officials involved in negotiations at the UN, as well as senior ANC officials 
in Johannesburg, that the absence of a managed transition of power had led to the breakdown 
of security in Libya because the Western-backed NTC did not have the means to successfully 
assume full control of the country, and that many power brokers who had previously relied on 
GaddDIL¶V SDWURQDJH ZHUH QRZ GDQJHURXVO\ DOLHQDWHG ZLWK QR VWDNH LQ WKH QHZ SROLWLFDO
dispensation. 6RXWK $IULFD¶V 'HSXW\ )RUHLJQ 0LQLVWHU DUJXHG UHFHQWO\ WKDW 1$72¶V
LQWHUYHQWLRQ KDG EHHQ µFDWDVWURSKLF¶ DQG KDG ODVWLQJ LPSOLFDWLRQV IRU WKH ongoing crisis in 
Syria, declaring that: 
The military intervention is Libya was a major miscalculation by the West, 
contributing to the current chaos in the country. By ignoring the need to foster 
dialogue between the various groups to discuss the establishment of strong 
institutions, a future constitution and democratization of Libya, the international 
FRPPXQLW\ OHIWD IUDFWXUHG/LE\DQVRFLHW\ZKLFK LVDOVRGHVWDELOL]LQJ WKHUHJLRQ«
Taking a cue from our own history we know that in order for the solution in Syria to 
be sustainable it must be representative and therefore no party can or should be 
excluded from the peace process.  The struggle against apartheid lasted decades and 
was declared a crime against humanity, nonetheless the transition and the new 
constitution was negotiated between the liberation movements and the government of 
the day who were the perpetrators of apartheid.   The lesson here is that a lasting 
solution must be rooted in an all-inclusive process.  This is especially important in 
diverse and polarised societies. (Ebrahim 2014) 
Indeed, according to a recent briefing given to the Security Council, the instability and unrest 
in Libya following the NATO intervention has led the country on µD QHZ WUDMHFWRU\ RI
XQSUHFHGHQWHG YLROHQFH¶ (UN 2014). Two rival governments currently claim legitimacy, 
creating a power vacuum while a variety of militias fight it out for supremacy in a conflict 
which threatens to escalate into a full-blown civil war ± aided and abetted in no small part by 
the vast quantity of arms that were pumped into the country during the final weeks of 
*DGGDIL¶VUXOH.  DIRCO officials also raised concerns about the dangers of regional hard-line 
Islamists being strengthened by NATO ignoring the need for a negotiated, inclusive 
settlement,  and that led to a breakdown of security in the wider region; an opinion shared by 
leading academic commentators (Marchal 2013) and Western media, with the New York 
Times (2014) recently ZDUQLQJ WKDW µWKH violence threatens to turn Libya into a pocket of 
chaos destabilizinJ1RUWK$IULFDIRU\HDUVWRFRPH¶  
$WKLUGHOHPHQWRI3UHWRULD¶VDSSURDFKWRSHDFHEXLOGLQJKDVEHHQWKHSURPRWLRQRIDEHVSRNH
form of transitional justice tailored to promote, above all else, a stable transition to liberal 
GHPRFUDF\%DVHGRQ6RXWK$IULFD¶VRZQH[SHULHQFHRIWUDQVLWLRQDOjustice and its the Truth 
and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), this might require a blend of restorative and 
UHWULEXWLYH MXVWLFH ZKHUH WKH LQGLYLGXDO¶V ULJKW WR SXUVXH UHWULEXWLYH MXVWLFH WKURXJK WKH
prosecution of perpetrators might have to be foregone if such action were to jeopardise the 
peace process. The logic behind this is simple: if protagonists (particularly incumbent state 
elites) fear punitive sentencing for their crimes then they will have no incentive to seek peace. 
In South Africa, conditional amnesties from crimes committed during the apartheid era were 
granted to perpetrators as a way to ensure that the old apartheid regime, as well as the 
security forces, intelligence services and civil servants, would agree to handing over power. 
The footpULQWRI6RXWK$IULFD¶VPRGHORIWUDQVLWLRQDOMXVWLFH± which itself borrows from the 
Latin American experience ± can be seen clearly in other African contexts, where attempts to 
EXLOGWUDQVLWLRQDOMXVWLFHKDYHERUURZHGXSRQHOHPHQWVRI6RXWK$IULFD¶VH[SHUience and, in 
some cases (such as Zimbabwe, Sierra Leone and Burundi) have been actively promoted and 
facilitated by South Africa itself. As prominent international law scholar William Schabas 
has argued, the kind of amnesty provision advocated by South Africa, while not without 
problems, should not be discarded by the International Criminal Court (ICC), whose zealous 
SXUVXLW RI UHWULEXWLYH MXVWLFH WKUHDWHQV WR µforever remove amnesty from the toolbox of 
conflict resolution and SHDFH QHJRWLDWLRQ¶ DQG FRXOG inadvertently prolong conflict and 
human rights abuse (Schabas 2004). As Alex Bellamy (2014a) notes, an inflexible pursuit of 
KXPDQ ULJKWV SHUSHWUDWRUV µmight inadvertently limit the deals that negotiators can offer 
perpetrators and damage already difficult relationships with political actors whose support is 
RIWHQQHHGHGWRHQGWKHYLROHQFH¶ 
,Q/LE\D6RXWK$IULFD¶VDSSURDFKWRWUDQVLWLRQDOMXVWLFHFDPHXSDJDLQVWVWURQJSUHVVXUHIURP
the ICC for a purely retributive form of justice directed at the Gaddafi regime. Although 
South Africa supported Resolution 1970 which referred the situation in Libya to the ICC for 
investigation, South African officials were extremely critical when the ICC issued arrest 
warrants for Gaddafi, his son and his top spy chief. ZuPD H[SUHVVHG KLV µH[WUHPH
GLVDSSRLQWPHQW¶ZLWKWKHWLPLQJRIWKHLVVXHRIWKHDUUHVWZDUUDQWVEHFDXVHKHZDVFRQFHUQHG
WKDW LW ZRXOG GHUDLO WKH $8¶V HIIRUWV WR PHGLDWH D QHJRWLDWHG VHWWOHPHQW ZKLFK =XPD ZDV
leading. To a degree then, this was a procedural criticism. However, it also highlights a 
deeper disagreement with how best to pursue justice in the face of mass atrocity. As one 
VHQLRU',5&2RIILFLDODW WKH81SXW LW µZKHUH\RXKDYHWKHRSSRUWXQLW\IRUSHDFHGR\RX
notwithstanding this opportunity, go IXOOWKURWWOHIRUMXVWLFH"¶6RXWK$IULFDQQHJRWLDWRUVLQWKH
81H[SODLQHGWKDWµ:HGRQ¶WORRNDW>,&&@UHIHUUDOVDVDPHDQVWRpunish individuals. The 
understanding was that the ICC would investigate the whole situation¶ 3HUVRQDO
communications, 2012). In this respect, the official argued that there was a danger that the 
,&& ZDV SHUFHLYHG µDV D FRXUW IRU YLFWRUV¶ MXVWLFH¶ EHFDXVH RI LWV KHDY\-handed and 
apparently one-sided pursuit of retributive justice against particular individuals. The official 
remarked that there was a danger that targeting one side of conflict at this stage would not 
only impair negotiations, it would also prevent a new democratic Libya from strategically 
choosing a bespoke form of a national-based transitional justice most suited to the political 
needs of the new administration. In short, the argument here was for a transitional justice 
settlement that prioritised political expediency over the immediate pursuit of retributive 
justice.  
7DNHQ WRJHWKHU 6RXWK $IULFD¶V DSSURDFK WR FRQIOLFW UHVROXWLRQ DQG SHDFH EXLOGLQJ RIIHUV D
significant counterpoint to the kind of intervention modelled by the NATO powers in Libya. 
,WZRXOGEHFUXGHWRGLVPLVV6RXWK$IULFD¶VSRVLWLRQDVDVLPSOHWULXPSKRf pragmatism over 
unfaltering ideals: at its core, there is a normative commitment to preventing the escalation of 
humanitarian crises, combating regional instability and fostering durable transitions to liberal 
democracy. Tactical moral duplicity might be a short-term means to achieve long-term 
substantive and enduring liberal outcomes. As the next section will argue, however, South 
Africa has great difficulty justifying this position, which is not without its own shortcomings.  
Growing pains of an emerging power  
South African policy makers expressed severe frustration that their approach to intervention 
LQ /LE\D ZDV QRW EHLQJ WDNHQ VHULRXVO\ DQG WKDW DV WKH\ VDZ LW 1$72¶V PLVVLRQ FUHHS LQ
Libya was an abrogation of the very principles that had prompted South African support for 
1973 in the first place. One senior DIRCO official involved in the UN bemoaned what they 
VDZ DV D µFOHDU FRQWUDYHQWLRQ RQ WKH 81 FKDUWHU¶ DQG WKDW WKH OHJLWLPDF\ RI WKH 6HFXULW\
Council was now in jeopardy because it waV µQRW DQ honest broker anymore¶ (Personal 
communications). For these officials, a serious and robust debate was needed to resurrect 
consensus in the RtoP principle following the cynicism generated by the NATO intervention 
EHFDXVH LWZDV LPSRUWDQW WKDW WKH µEDE\VKRXOGQRWEH WKURZQRXWZLWK WKHEDWKZDWHU¶ZLWK
respect to the RtoP (Personal communications); sentiments that appear to support Alex 
%HOODP\¶V (2014b) argument that the NATO intervention in Libya has not delegitimized the 
RtoP principle in general. 
However, while South Africa might have something to say about how the RtoP principle 
could be taken forward after Libya, Pretoria struggles to make sure its voice is heard. Senior 
DIRCO officials at the UN would commonly lament that they had been outplayed in terms of 
public diplomacy. As one senior official complained, the Western powers µDUH EHWWHU WKDQ
anyone else at playing the public opinion game. And they have huge media sources at their 
disposal. Often [elected members of the Security Council] have good diplomats and know the 
UN very well but are not very good communicators to the public¶ (Personal 
communications). In the case of Libya, the official noted that this was often because they 
ZHUH WRR µILQLFN\¶ RQ FRQFHSWXDO GHEDWHs and debates about the precise wordings of the 
UHVROXWLRQVDQGWKDWµXQIRUWXQDWHO\ZLWK/LE\DWKHUHZDVDKXJHGHEDWHKHOGLQSXEOLFDQGLWV
QRWVH[\LQSXEOLFWRGHEDWHDERXWZKDWFRQFHSWVPHDQ¶7KLVZDVDSRLQWJHQHUDOO\FRQFHGHG
by officials: that the Western powers were simply more experienced, skilled and adept at 
controlling the public debates and how Council resolutions ± and the reactions to them ± 
would be framed and interpreted. More broadly, this reflects longer-term issues regarding the 
lack of diplomatic and material capacity, as well as a lack of experience, confronting South 
Africa which put constraints on its ability to behave as a global player at present (Aldmen and 
Schoeman, 2013, p.123). 
South Africa also needs to confront the limitations of its approach to conflict resolution. 
Although space does not permit a lengthy critique of the South African approach, a few core 
issues regarding Libya can be highlighted. First, the fact that quiet diplomacy and power 
sharing agreements appear to have become an article of faith for South Africa is deeply 
problematic. As Biti and Cheeseman (2010) have noted, the idea that consociational power 
sharing can simply be rolled out across the continent ignores the manner in which these 
processes can be appropriated by incumbent elites to reinvigorate their power and 
LQWHUQDWLRQDO VWDQGLQJ 7KH UHFHQW H[DPSOH RI =LPEDEZH ZKHUH 0XJDEH¶V =$18 3)
skilfully navigated the power sharing arrangements to reinvigorate its power without 
fundamentally altering the style of its rule (Raftopoulos, 2013), challenges recent South 
African narratives (Ebrahim, 2011) that its promotion of quiet diplomacy and power sharing 
has borne fruit. A monolithic and ahistorical fixation on power sharing has ironically neglects 
the nuances of the historical experience that made this successful in South Africa. The old 
apartheid regime had no alternative but to gradually concede power, while the ANC had little 
choice but to accept a negotiated settlement because of the end of the Cold War and the fact 
that it could not hope to militarily overthrow the old regime. International pressure to find a 
negotiated settlement also narrowed the options available, making power sharing of some 
form inevitable. In Libya, Gaddafi made no commitment to share power with the rebels and 
at no time was it clear that he accepted his time in office was over. Nor was there another 
willing partner ready to negotiate: the NTC steadfastly resisted a negotiated settlement, 
especially once it had become clear that the offer of a full NATO-sponsored revolution was 
on the cards. Furthermore, it was impossible for South Africa to promote an alternative form 
of transitional justice once the ICC had issued its arrest warrants: once the prospects of a 
EHVSRNHIRUPRIWUDQVLWLRQDO MXVWLFHZHUHXVXUSHGE\WKH,&&ZDUUDQWV*DGGDIL¶VIROORZHUV
had little reason to place their trust in some form of post-settlement amnesty provision.  
South Africa therefore needed to be much more flexible in its approach towards Libya 
because such a rigid adherence to its own model in this case flew in the face of the lessons of 
its own historical experience. Furthermore, the relative deficiencies in its diplomatic capacity 
compound its inability to control the Security Council agenda, and its particular approach to 
conflict resolution will always be undermined by the parallel pursuit of regime change and 
narrowly-targeted retributive justice on the part of other powers. 
Conclusion 
7KH1$72LQWHUYHQWLRQLQ/LE\DKDVRSHQHGXSDµOHJLWLPDF\IDXOWOLQH¶LQWKHLQWHUQDWLRQDO
community and a broad debate about the accountability of the Security Council, its 
representativeness, and also the future of humanitarian interventions (Ralph and Gallagher 
2014). The LQWHUYHQWLRQUHTXLUHGDµSHUIHFWVWRUP¶RISROLWLFDOIDFWRUVWRFRDOHVFHLQRUGHUWR
secure  a Security Council mandate for intervention, including the lack of strong opposition 
from a veto-wielding Council member, the presence of regional support, and a deeply divided 
and poorly articulated African response (Dunn and Gifkins 2013). The current difficulties in 
establishing a coherent internaWLRQDOUHVSRQVHWR6\ULDKRZHYHUKLJKOLJKWVWKDWVXFKµSHUIHFW
VWRUPV¶ DUH XQOLNHO\ WR JDWKHU IUHTXHQWO\ LQ D ZRUOG RI LPSHUIHFW SRZHUV 7KH IXWXUH RI
successful humanitarian interventions in Africa could well rest on whether Western powers 
are willing to embrace greater pluralism in debates about the nature of interventions, which 
will require a much deeper understanding of the motivations driving the foreign policies of 
the emerging powers beyond inaccurate, self-serving and hypocritical accusations of flip 
flopping and moral duplicity. As former AU Chairperson Jean Ping recently remarked, the 
1$72 SRZHUV H[KLELWHG D µVHQVH RI VXSHULRULW\¶ ZKHQ WKH\ DUURJDQWO\ GLVPLVVHG 6RXWK
$IULFD¶VHIIRUWVWRPHGLDWHLQWKH/LE\DQFULVLVDQDUURJDQFHWKDWKHDUJXHVOHGWKHPWRLJQRUH
African warnings RI WKH µH[SORVLRQ¶ WKDW ZRXOG IROORZ 1$72-sponsored regime change 
(Mail & Guardian 2014). 
%XWGRWKHHPHUJLQJSRZHUVKDYHDQ\WKLQJWRVD\WKDWLVZRUWKOLVWHQLQJWR"6RXWK$IULFD¶V
broad approach to conflict mediation and transitional justice is no silver bullet for 
interventions in Africa. Still, it nonetheless offers an important alternative to the kind of 
intervention led by the NATO powers in Libya, which has resulted in a proliferation of 
violence and threatens stability in the region as a whole. If Pretoria is able to articulate its 
approach more effectively then its voice could contribute to the broadening of options 
DYDLODEOHLQWKHWRRONLWRILQWHUYHQWLRQ6RXWK$IULFD¶VDWWHPSWWRDWWDLQDSHUPDQHQWSODFHRQ
the Security Council could be one means of achieving this, and Iits influence will continue to 
hold considerable sway in the corridors of the AU in the near future, especially given the 
election of Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma as AU Chair. Owing to its size, South Africa might 
claim a responsibility to take a lead on interventions in Africa. But as it does so it would do 
well to confront the limitations of its own approach, and other African states should consider 
whether South Africa is really the continental champion they want.  
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